Bywords 41

41. I say Jack is lost in thought without thereby meaning by this that he does not know what it is that he is thinking. The sentence does not describe Jack’s mental state, but rather the depth of his immersion in it, which I observe and communicate to him. If I want to learn of him, I ask what he is thinking, and what he tells me I might understand  – or equally not understand. Naturally, I cannot tell from his behavior alone what he is thinking at the time, but the picture of thought as something that happens in the head nonetheless informs my interest in this behavior as something noteworthy and as something which deserves my attention. 

Thought observed in behavior typically attracts the interest of another. This interest is fascination in a perceived object in the head – an ‘inner object’ – not currently viewable in its entirety, but which beckons from within the shell of its human encasing an opportunity for another to receive ‘full disclosure’. My interest in your thought converges upon it as though I were approaching an object, and the subsequent description of your thought is taken by me as the description of an object which I can picture in my own mind. The picture of thought as something that happens in the head is very strong. It really does force itself upon us here.